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In the early hours of May 3, 1998, the lead-
ers of the European Union (EU) took the most
significant step toward European integration
since the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957.
In giving the green light to the economic and
monetary union (EMU) of eleven of the fifteen
EU members—the EU11—they took another
major step toward a more unified Europe.
1 This
latest development culminates a process of
European integration that began shortly after
World War II and that may one day lead to a
Europe as politically and economically inte-
grated as the United States is today. The sub-
stance of monetary union is that the countries in
EMU no longer have distinct national curren-
cies. A new currency—the euro—has replaced
them, and monetary policy for the EU11 is no
longer determined by their national central
banks but by the European System of Central
Banks (ESCB). (See Glossary, page 4.)
The unprecedented monetary union of
such a large and disparate group of sovereign
nations will pose enormous challenges to the
ESCB, which consists of the recently established
European Central Bank (ECB) and the national
central banks (NCBs) of EU members. The ECB
commenced operations on June 1, 1998, and
assumed responsibility for the conduct of mone-
tary policy for the euro area on January 1, 1999.
The euro has replaced the national currencies of
the EU11, and in 2002 the notes and coins that
currently circulate in these countries will cease
to be legal tender.
2
The ESCB is conducting monetary policy
on a continental scale. Table 1 presents com-
parative statistics for the United States, the EU,
the EU11, and Japan. In terms of population and
aggregate output, the EU11 is comparable to the
United States. Should EMU eventually incorpo-
rate all fifteen members of the EU, its economic
weight would significantly exceed that of the
United States. Table 1 also compares the recent
economic performance of the four groups. The
most significant difference is the much poorer
employment performance of the EU, whose
unemployment rate is more than twice that of
the United States. The consensus among econo-
mists is that the bulk of this unemployment is
structural rather than cyclical and reflects the
greater rigidity of Europe’s labor market insti-
tutions.
3
The extent to which the euro can credibly
challenge the U.S. dollar’s primacy in global
finance will depend largely on the ECB’s suc-
cess in maintaining the euro’s purchasing power
and making it attractive to international in-
vestors. The structure of the ESCB is similar in
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many ways to that of another central bank
charged with conducting monetary policy on a
continental scale—the Federal Reserve System.
In this article, I review the structure of the new
central bank, sketching out key similarities to and
differences from the Federal Reserve.
THE ROAD TO EMU
EMU is the latest step in the move toward
greater economic (and political) integration in
Europe that began with the establishment of the
European Payments Union in 1950. That entity
was little more than a technical device to facili-
tate the reconstruction of Europe following the
devastation of World War II. But it can also be
seen as the first manifestation of the political
will to forge closer bonds between the wartime
belligerents so as to preclude future conflict. A
more substantive step was taken in 1951 with
the formation of the European Coal and Steel
Community, which created a common market for
these commodities involving Germany, France,
Italy, and the Benelux countries (Belgium,
Netherlands, and Luxembourg). This entity was
supposed to be accompanied by stronger polit-
ical and military ties (including the creation of a
European army), but concerns about loss of
national sovereignty led to abandonment of
these plans. Instead, the emphasis shifted to
greater integration on the economic front, and
in 1957 the Treaty of Rome created the Euro-
pean Economic Community (EEC), or Common
Market. Coordination of economic policies was
always seen as integral to the success of the
Common Market, and in 1964 the Committee 
of Governors of the central banks of the Euro-
pean Community (EC) was formed to coordi-
nate monetary policies. The central banks of
Europe have had varying degrees of success
coordinating their monetary policies over the
past three decades.
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Monetary union of EC members was pro-
posed in 1970 in the Werner Report. While this
report envisioned a monetary union by 1980,
two key international developments derailed
the plan. The first was the breakdown of the
Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates
in August 1971; the second was the 1973 oil 
crisis. The EC responded to the exchange rate
turbulence that followed both events with a sys-
tem of quasi-fixed exchange rates, the so-called
snake, but this rapidly collapsed to an arrange-
ment involving only a few members. The sec-
ond attempt to fix exchange rates, the European
Monetary System, was established in 1979. It
proved more durable, although it, too, experi-
enced a number of major and minor crises. By
the mid-1980s the EC had expanded to twelve
members, and in 1989, renewed interest in a
formal monetary union resulted in the Delors
Report.
The Delors Report laid out the basic plan
and timetable for monetary union that has been
followed since the early 1990s. The proposals in
the report were incorporated into the Treaty on
European Union, which was agreed upon at a
meeting of the European Council in Maastricht,
Netherlands, in December 1991 and signed 
in February 1992. This agreement, commonly
known as the Maastricht Treaty, was the most
comprehensive change in the basic law of the
European Community since the Treaty of Rome.
It established the institutional framework for
monetary policy under EMU, a timetable for 
the creation of a monetary union, and the cri-
teria for countries’ participation. Many academic
economists and others have questioned the wis-
dom of a monetary union between such dis-
parate countries, but the debate became moot
with the decision to proceed.
5 However, the
points made by the critics of monetary union
indicate where stresses may arise in the future
and the kind of challenges the ECB may face.
INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES
The Maastricht Treaty established the insti-
tutional arrangements for the conduct of mone-
tary policy under EMU. The treaty provides for
the formation of the ESCB, which in many ways
is indirectly modeled on the Federal Reserve
System.
6 At the top of the ESCB is the Frankfurt-
based ECB, which has a role similar to that of
the Federal Reserve’s Board of Governors. The
various national central banks play a role simi-
lar to that of the regional Federal Reserve Banks.
Table 1
Comparative Statistics on the U.S., EU, EU11, and Japan
U.S. EU EU11 Japan
Population 263 million 373 million 290 million 126 million
GDP (current $6.955 trillion $8.497 trillion $6.809 trillion $5.217 trillion
dollars)
GDP (constant $6.149 trillion $7.203 trillion $5.721 trillion $3.168 trillion
dollars)
GDP growth 3.8 percent 2.6 percent 2.4 percent .9 percent
Inflation rate 2.3 percent 1.9 percent 1.7 percent 1.7 percent
Unemployment 4.9 percent 11.1 percent 11.7 percent 3.4 percent
rate
SOURCES: Population and GDP for 1995: United Nations (1997). GDP growth, inflation, and
unemployment for 1997: OECD Economic Outlook and OECD Main Economic
Indicators.4
Monetary policy decisions are made by the
Governing Council of the ECB, which consists of
the Executive Board of the ECB and the gov-
ernors of the participating countries’ central
banks. The Executive Board consists of the
president and vice president of the ECB and
four other members. The president of the ECB
chairs the Governing Council, in essence occu-
pying a position similar to that of the chairman
of the Fed’s Board of Governors. Under the
Maastricht Treaty, the Governing Council is
responsible for formulating monetary policy for
the single-currency area, while the Executive
Board is responsible for implementing mone-
tary policy.
7 Executive Board members are
appointed for nonrenewable eight-year terms,
shorter than the fourteen-year terms of Federal
Reserve Governors but the same as the terms 
of members of the Directorate of Deutsche
Bundesbank.
RELATIONSHIP OF THE ECB AND NCBS
While there are many similarities in the
structures of the ESCB and the Federal Reserve
System, there are also important differences.
The Executive Board of the ECB will be in a
permanent minority on the Governing Council,
whereas the Board of Governors has a perma-
nent majority on the Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC). All NCB governors have a
vote in all policy decisions of the Governing
Council, whereas with a single exception, Re-
serve Bank presidents participate in FOMC
votes every two or three years, depending on
which Bank they represent. Indeed, the rela-
tionship of the ECB and the NCBs probably
bears a closer resemblance to the relationship of
the Board of Governors and the Reserve Banks
in the early years of the Federal Reserve System
than to the situation today. For its first twenty
years, power was more diffuse in the Federal
Reserve System than it is now. Some critics have
argued that this diffuse distribution of power
and the struggle for hegemony contributed to
the Fed’s inability to deal with the Great Depres-
sion (see in particular Friedman and Schwartz
1963).
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Friedman and Schwartz (1963) contend
that the distribution of power in the Federal
Reserve System was a key contributor to the
“ineptness” of monetary policy during the De-
pression. In the 1920s, the institutional structure
did not present a problem as long as all regional
Reserve Banks and the Board were willing to
accept the leadership of the governor of the
New York Bank, Benjamin Strong. But with
Strong’s departure in 1928, the structure became
unworkable. The other Reserve Banks were no
longer willing to accept the domination of the
New York Bank, and the Board was not in a
position to impose its will on the System.
Friedman and Schwartz argue that the Board’s
weak position was due to the fact that it had not
played a leadership role in the System in the
1920s but had instead functioned primarily as a
supervisory and review body.
The distribution of power in the ESCB dif-
fers from that in the Federal Reserve System in
other important respects as well. For example,
the Board of Governors exercises a lot more
Glossary
European Economic Community (EEC): Also known as the Common Market,
established by the Treaty of Rome in 1957.
European Monetary Institute (EMI): Created by the Maastricht Treaty to carry out
preparatory work for EMU; dissolved with the establishment of the European Central
Bank.
European Parliament: Advises the European Commission and reviews all legislative
proposals; members are elected by popular vote.
European System of Central Banks (ESCB): Responsible for conducting monetary
policy for the economic and monetary union (EMU).The ESCB consists of the
European Central Bank and the national central banks of all fifteen EU members.
The ESCB is governed by the decision-making bodies of the ECB.
European Central Bank (ECB): The central bank for the economic and mone-
tary union.The decision-making bodies of the ECB are the Governing Council
and the Executive Board.
Executive Board: Responsible for the day-to-day functioning of the ECB
and the implementation of the single monetary policy.
Governing Council: Consists of the Executive Board of the ECB and the
governors of the national central banks of the states participating in EMU.
Responsible for the formulation of a single monetary policy.
National central bank (NCB): The individual central banks of countries in the
European Union.
European Community (EC): Consists of the European Coal and Steel Community,
the European Atomic Energy Community, and the European Economic Community.
The EC became the European Union  when the Maastricht Treaty took effect on
November 1, 1993.
European Union (EU): Established by the Maastricht Treaty to deepen economic
and political links between the countries of Europe.
Council of Ministers: The primary decision-making institution of the European
Union; consists of ministerial-level representatives of all EU states.
European Council: The name given to the Council of Ministers when it
meets in the form of EU heads of state or government.
ECOFIN: The name given to the Council of Ministers when it meets in the
form of EU economics and finance ministers.
European Commission: The executive branch of the European Union; respon-
sible for implementing the decisions of the Council of Ministers and proposing
new measures and directions for the EU.
Maastricht Treaty: More formally, the Treaty on European Union; signed in 1992 by
the EU heads of state, it established the framework for economic and monetary
union in Europe.
Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European
Central Bank: The statute, appended to the Maastricht Treaty, detailing the
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power in the Federal Reserve System than the
ECB exercises within the ESCB. One source of
the Board’s power is its authority to supervise
the Reserve Banks’ activities and approve their
budgets and the appointment of their presi-
dents. Furthermore, the Board of Governors
appoints three of the nine directors of the
regional Reserve Banks, one of whom is desig-
nated chairman of the board of directors and
Federal Reserve agent.
9 The Board also appoints
the deputy chairman of the board of each
regional Bank.
By contrast, the Maastricht Treaty gives the
Governing Council control over the Executive
Board:
The terms and conditions of employment
of the members of the Executive Board, 
in particular their salaries, pensions and
other social security benefits shall be the
subject of contracts with the ECB and shall
be fixed by the Governing Council on a
proposal from a Committee comprising
three members appointed by the Govern-
ing Council and three members appointed
by the Council. The members of the
Executive Board shall not have the right to
vote on matters referred to in this para-
graph. (Statute of the European System of
Central Banks and of the European Central
Bank, Article 11)
Also, the principle of subsidiarity (whereby EU
decisions are supposed to be made at the 
lowest possible level of political authority) may
pose a fundamental obstacle to centralization of
power with the ECB. The importance of this
principle in EU decision making should not be
underestimated; it is even articulated in the pre-
amble to the Maastricht Treaty. The national
central banks could use subsidiarity as a
weapon to prevent the ECB from developing
expertise in areas the NCBs feel are properly
their province.
The distribution of power within the ECB
differs slightly from that in the Board of Gov-
ernors. It is generally accepted that the chair-
man of the Board of Governors is more power-
ful than any of the other Board members.
10
Maisel (1973) attributes the power of the chair-
man to a number of factors. The first is his role
as titular head of the Federal Reserve System
and his role as its spokesman; only the chairman
speaks for the System as a whole. The second is
the role of the chairman as the representative of
the System in other forums. The third is the
inherent power of the chairman to set the agenda
for FOMC meetings. Fourth, the Board of Gover-
nors’ delegation of much of its supervisory power
over the staff and the System to the chairman
enhances the position’s authority within the
System. And finally, the chairman has the ability
to attract votes simply by virtue of office.
The president of the ECB also possesses
powers beyond those of other Executive Board
or Governing Council members. The president
chairs meetings of both bodies and casts the de-
ciding vote in the event of a tie.
11 He also repre-
sents the ECB externally.
12 Under Article 109b of
the treaty, the president of the ECB may be
invited to participate in Council meetings and
presents the ECB’s annual report to the Council
and the European Parliament. Perhaps the only
additional source of power potentially but not
currently available to the president is full con-
trol over the ECB’s staff. Each of the six mem-
bers of the Executive Board oversees some
areas of the ECB’s operations.
13 The Economics
and Research Directorates, which employ the
bulk of the ECB’s professional economists, do
not report to the president but to another board
member.
APPOINTMENT PROCESS
All seven members of the Fed’s Board of
Governors are appointed by the president of the
United States and are subject to Senate confir-
mation. The Federal Reserve Act requires that
“in selecting the members of the Board, not
more than one of whom shall be selected from
any one Federal Reserve district, the president
shall have due regard to a fair representation of
the financial, agricultural, industrial, and com-
mercial interests, and geographical divisions of
the country.”
14 Regional Reserve Bank presidents
are nominated by the boards of directors of
those banks, but their final appointment is sub-
ject to approval by the Board of Governors.
The ECB Executive Board is appointed by
the European Council, with nominees subject to
confirmation by the European Parliament. The
Maastricht Treaty does not contain any provi-
sions about the national composition of the
Executive Board analogous to those in the
Federal Reserve Act. However, the reality of EU
politics is such that it would be unthinkable for
there to be more than one national of any EU
country on the board. While the European Par-
liament confirms nominees to the Executive
Board, in reality Parliament has little real power
to reject a nominee. The governors of the NCBs
are appointed by their national governments
and are not subject to approval by the ECB’s
Executive Board.6
MONETARY POLICY OBJECTIVES
The Maastricht Treaty is unambiguous
about the objective of monetary policy:
The primary objective of the ESCB shall be
to maintain price stability. Without preju-
dice to the objective of price stability, the
ESCB shall support the general economic
policies in the Community with a view to
the achievement of the objectives of the
Community as laid down in Article 2. The
ESCB shall act in accordance with the
principle of an open market economy with
free competition, favoring an efficient allo-
cation of resources, and in compliance
with the principles set out in Article 3a.
15
(Maastricht Treaty, Article 105)
This mandate is qualified by an obligation to
“support the general economic policies in 
the Community,” but this support should be
“without prejudice to the objective of price 
stability.”
16 Treaty provisions dealing with the
objectives of the ESCB are modeled on those in
the Bundesbank Act but, interestingly, are a lot
more specific about the ultimate objectives of
monetary policy than is the German legislation.
That act requires that “the Deutsche Bundesbank
shall regulate the amount of money in circula-
tion and of credit supplied to the economy—
with the aim of safeguarding the currency”
(Deutsche Bundesbank 1995, 23). Arguably, the
act could be seen as giving the Bundesbank the
freedom to choose between stabilizing the in-
ternal value of the currency—that is, the price
level—or the external value of the currency, as
reflected by the exchange rate.
The ESCB’s mandate to pursue price sta-
bility contrasts with the Federal Reserve’s more
ambiguous mandate:
The Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System and the Federal Open
Market Committee shall maintain long run
growth of the monetary and credit aggre-
gates commensurate with the country’s
long run potential to increase production,
so as to promote effectively the goals of
maximum employment, stable prices and
moderate long-term interest rates. (Federal
Reserve Act, Section 2A.1)
Maisel (1973, 66) contends that the Fed has tra-
ditionally placed more emphasis on achieving
price stability than on its other mandated objec-
tives. Many economists believe that price stabil-
ity is a precondition for the objectives of sus-
tainable growth and high employment.
In recent years there have been calls for a
clearer price stability mandate for the Federal
Reserve System. For example, Hetzel (1990) has
supported a mandate that stipulates price stabil-
ity as the Fed’s primary goal. Hetzel favored the
Neal Resolution (House Joint Resolution 409),
introduced in September 1989, which would
have required that “the Federal Open Market
Committee of the Federal Reserve System…
adopt and pursue monetary policies to reduce
inflation gradually in order to eliminate inflation
by not later than 5 years from the date of the
enactment of this legislation and shall then
adopt and pursue monetary policies to maintain
price stability.” More recently, the Mack-Saxton
bill, introduced in 1995 and reintroduced in
1997, would have made long-term price stabil-
ity the primary goal of the Federal Reserve
System. While several Reserve Bank presidents
and the chairman of the Board of Governors
have testified before Congress in support of 
legislation to mandate price stability as the Fed’s
sole objective, this legislation has not gotten
very far. The reasons for this are unclear: it may
simply be that inflation is not currently per-
ceived to be a major problem in the United
States and that in the current low-inflation envi-
ronment it would be undesirable for the Fed to
de-emphasize output stabilization in its policy
decisions.
INDEPENDENCE
The ESCB is probably the most indepen-
dent central bank in the world.
17 The source of
this independence is manifold. At the most basic
level, the fact that the charter of the ESCB is an
international treaty that can only be changed
with the unanimous consent of its signatories
makes it very difficult to exert political pressure
on the ESCB. Furthermore, the Maastricht Treaty
explicitly addresses the relationship between
the ESCB and the political authorities in the EU:
When exercising the powers and carrying
out the tasks and duties conferred upon
them by this Treaty and the Statute of 
the ESCB, neither the ECB, nor a national
central bank, nor any member of their
decision-making bodies shall seek or take
instructions from Community institutions
or bodies, from any government of a
Member State or from any other body. The
Community institutions and bodies and
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undertake to respect this principle and not
to seek to influence the members of the
decision-making bodies of the ECB or of
the national central banks in the perfor-
mance of their tasks. (Maastricht Treaty,
Article 107)
The reason for granting such strong indepen-
dence to the ESCB is the overwhelming evi-
dence that independent central banks tend to
deliver relatively better inflation performance
(that is, lower rates of inflation) at no cost in
terms of slower real output growth or higher
unemployment. Banaian, Laney, and Willett
(1983) were among the first to examine the rela-
tionship between central bank independence
and inflation outcomes. Subsequent work by
Alesina and Summers (1993) shows that the 
better inflation performance delivered by inde-
pendent central banks comes at no cost in terms
of real economic performance. Numerous other
studies (see, for example, Cukierman, Webb,
and Neyapti 1992 and Eijffinger and De Haan
1996) confirm these findings.
Other provisions of the Maastricht Treaty
further reinforce the independence of the ESCB.
First, Executive Board members and governors
of the NCBs are appointed for relatively long
terms. Executive Board members have nonre-
newable eight-year terms, while NCB governors
are appointed for a minimum of five years.
18 The
terms of the first appointees to the Executive
Board were staggered from four to eight years
so that subsequent terms will also be staggered.
Second, the treaty states:
Overdraft facilities or any other type of
credit facility with the ECB or with the
central banks of the Member States (here-
inafter referred to as “national central
banks”) in favor of Community institutions
or bodies, central governments, regional,
local or other public authorities, other
bodies governed by public law, or public
undertakings of Member States shall be
prohibited, as shall the purchase directly
from them by the ECB or national central
banks of debt instruments. (Maastricht
Treaty, Article 104)
This prohibition is restated in Article 21 of the
statute of the ESCB and ECB.
It is worth noting that some authors have
recently challenged the causal interpretation of
the relationship between central bank indepen-
dence and inflation outcomes. Specifically, Posen
(1993) has argued it is popular opposition to
inflation that leads to independent central banks
and low inflation outcomes. The corollary is that
simply granting independence to a central bank
is insufficient to generate good inflation perfor-
mance unless the central bank has significant
political support. Attaining such support is one
of the greatest challenges facing the ESCB. There
is little doubt the Bundesbank’s success in pur-
suing price stability has been helped consider-
ably by strong public support for the central
bank’s policies. The ESCB—at least initially—
will not enjoy anything like the same degree of
support, and this may complicate the political
environment in which it has to operate.
19
Central bank independence takes many
forms. Fischer (1994) distinguishes between goal
independence and instrument independence.
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In his taxonomy, “a central bank whose goals
are imprecisely defined has goal independence”
(Fischer 1994, 292). Since the Maastricht Treaty
makes price stability the primary goal of the
ESCB without defining what is meant by price
stability, the ESCB enjoys considerable goal
independence. Thus, the ESCB could define
price stability to mean a stable price level, or a
specific (low) inflation rate, or as prevailing
when “inflation ceases to be a factor in the day
to day decisions of households and businesses.”
The European Monetary Institute (EMI) argued
that a public announcement of a quantified 
definition of price stability should be an inte-
gral component of whatever monetary strategy
the ECB pursues. In October 1998 the ECB
announced that “price stability shall be defined
as a year-on-year increase in the Harmonised
Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for the euro
area of below 2%.”
21 The ECB also announced
that “price stability is to be maintained over the
medium term,” without defining medium term.
Fischer considers a central bank to have instru-
ment independence “when it has full discretion
and power to deploy monetary policy to attain
its goals.” By that definition, the ESCB enjoys
full instrument independence.
Under Article 109b of the Maastricht
Treaty, the president of the Council of Ministers
and a member of the European Commission
(the executive branch of the EU) have the right
to participate as nonvoting members in meet-
ings of the ECB’s Governing Council. Further-
more, the president of the Council of Ministers
has the right to submit motions for deliberation
by the Governing Council. Article 109b also
stipulates that “the President of the ECB shall be
invited to participate in Council meetings when
the Council is discussing matters relating to the
objectives and tasks of the ESCB.”Letter) temporarily released the Bundesbank
from its obligation to intervene to support fixed
exchange rates in the European Monetary
System if such intervention threatened price 
stability in Germany.
24 This understanding was
invoked in September 1992 when intervention
to support the Italian lira threatened the
Bundesbank’s ability to hit its money growth
targets.
However, some argue that laws can only
go so far in ensuring a central bank’s indepen-
dence. What politicians give, they can just as
easily take away. Others contend that in rela-
tionships between central banks and political
authorities, personalities matter as much if not
more than laws. Friedman and Schwartz (1963,
228) suggest as much in discussing the early
relationship of the Fed and the Treasury. Gio-
vannini (1993) makes a more compelling case
along these lines. He argues that the ESCB’s
independence, as codified in the treaty and
statute, is a necessary but insufficient condition
for the successful pursuit of low inflation.
Substantial and consistent political support is
also required.
The Federal Reserve System enjoys sig-
nificant independence, but, notes Maisel (1973,
24), it is “ill-defined and circumscribed.” The
Constitution gives Congress the right “to coin
money and regulate the value thereof.” Congress
has delegated this authority to the Federal Re-
serve but could, in principle, revoke it at any
time. The Federal Reserve Act has been amended
and supplemented several times since its pas-
sage in 1913, although typically the changes
have given the Fed greater operational inde-
pendence while simultaneously increasing its
accountability to Congress.
ACCOUNTABILITY
As noted above, the ESCB is the most
independent central bank in the world. The
Maastricht Treaty ensures that the ESCB will not
be torn between pursuing multiple objectives or
subject to political pressure to take what it
views as inappropriate policy actions. However,
the quid pro quo of central bank independence
in a democratic society is that there should be
adverse consequences for the central bank if it
fails to achieve its objectives. Some critics have
argued that independent central banks are fun-
damentally inconsistent with democratic princi-
ples (see, for example, Friedman 1962).
The Maastricht Treaty imposes minimal
reporting obligations on the ECB, requiring only
that the ECB submit an annual report to the
8
This arrangement echoes somewhat the
early structure of the Federal Reserve System.
Until 1935, the secretary of the Treasury and the
comptroller of the currency were ex officio
members of the eight-member Federal Reserve
Board, with the secretary of the Treasury also
acting as Board chairman. The Banking Act of
1935 removed both officials from the Board. As
noted above, the motivation for centralizing
power at the Board of Governors was to elimi-
nate perceived ambiguities about the distribu-
tion of power in the System that were believed
to have contributed to the failure of Fed policy
during the Depression.
22 While the president of
the Council of Ministers does not have the same
degree of formal power to influence ECB delib-
erations as the Treasury secretary had over the
Federal Reserve System in its early years, his
presence at Governing Council meetings may
influence the course of debate in ways that 
are difficult to anticipate. The ECB arrangement
more closely mirrors the provision in Article
13.2 of the Bundesbank Act, whereby represen-
tatives of the government have the right to
attend (without voting) meetings of the Bundes-
bank Council. In practice, the only time gov-
ernment ministers do attend Bundesbank meet-
ings is when the annual money supply targets
are being set.
The independence of the ESCB, or at least
its ability to pursue price stability, is circum-
scribed somewhat by the fact that exchange rate
policy remains the province of the Council of
Ministers. Article 109 of the Maastricht Treaty
stipulates that “in the absence of an exchange-
rate system in relation to one or more non-
Community currencies—the Council, acting by
a qualified majority either on a recommenda-
tion from the Commission and after consult-
ing the ECB or on a recommendation from the
ECB, may formulate general orientations for
exchange-rate policy in relation to these curren-
cies.” While the article goes on to state that
“these general orientations shall be without
prejudice to the primary objective of the ESCB
to maintain price stability,” it remains to be seen
how a conflict between the two goals—fixed
exchange rates and price stability—would be
resolved. A decision by EU political authorities
to fix the exchange rate of the euro vis-à-vis,
say, the dollar would seriously compromise the
ESCB’s ability to conduct a monetary policy tar-
geted solely at price stability in the euro area.
23
A similar situation prevailed in Germany before
the establishment of EMU. Apparently, an under-
standing between the Bundesbank and the
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European Parliament (and ECOFIN—the council
of economics and finance ministers, the European
Commission, and the European Council). The
president of the ECB has indicated his willing-
ness to testify before the European Parliament
up to four times a year. The treaty notes that the
ECB may decide to publish its decisions, rec-
ommendations, and opinions but does not im-
pose any obligation in this regard. The treaty also
provides for the ECB president and other Execu-
tive Board members to be heard by the relevant
committees of the European Parliament.
Some prominent members of the Euro-
pean Parliament have called for the ECB to
exceed its treaty obligations in communicating
with the public. Randzio-Plath argues that
in addition to publishing its annual and
quarterly reports the ECB should be
required to make public its decisions and
the reasoning behind its monetary policy
actions. The decisions of the Executive
Board meetings should be made public on
the same day. The Bank should explain
why the decision has been taken as well
as how the decision is linked to, and
affects other policies. Minutes should be
published, as should the voting behavior
of the members, on the day of the subse-
quent meeting of the Executive Board.
Detailed minutes should be published at
the latest five weeks after the meeting. The
reasons for decisions should be clear and
public. Transparency is needed in a
democracy. (Randzio-Plath 1997–98, 24)
There is little doubt that transparency is crucial
to the success of a central bank. However, how
best to achieve this is not always obvious. The
FOMC’s current practice is to announce policy
changes as soon as they are made. Immediately
after each meeting the FOMC issues a statement
that a decision was made to lower or raise rates,
or merely noting that the meeting ended, if the
decision is to leave rates unchanged. The FOMC
publishes the minutes of each meeting shortly
after the subsequent meeting.
The ECB does things differently. For a
variety of reasons, there is considerable resis-
tance to publishing minutes and the voting
records of Governing Council members. Per-
haps the most important reason is the need to
insulate Council members from domestic politi-
cal pressures. While the Executive Board and
the NCBs have statutory independence from
domestic and Community political institutions,
publication of voting records and the minutes of
Council meetings may lead to pressure to vote
along national lines rather than in the interests
of the euro area as a whole. Issing (1998) argues
that the Maastricht Treaty requires keeping the
votes of the Governing Council confidential. He
cites Article 10 of the statute, which states that
“the proceedings of the meetings [of the
Governing Council] shall be confidential. The
Governing Council may decide to make the 
outcome of its deliberations public.” Issing con-
tends that insofar as the votes of individual
Governing Council members can be considered
part of the proceedings rather than part of the
outcome, the treaty prohibits their publication.
Others argue that the votes could just as easily
be considered part of the outcome rather than
part of the proceedings and that publication of
votes would enhance Council members’ ability
to resist domestic political pressures.
25 It remains
to be seen whether the ECB’s decisions on con-
fidentiality will foster or impede the develop-
ment of its credibility.
STRATEGY
A strategy for monetary policy can be
defined as a rule whereby a central bank re-
sponds to developments in the economy to
attain its final objective. After much preparatory
work on possible strategies, the EMI concluded
that the only realistic options for the ESCB were
monetary targeting or inflation targeting.
According to the EMI, one of the key
attractions of monetary targeting is “that it
clearly indicates a responsibility of the central
bank for developments that are more directly
under its control.” An additional attraction of
monetary targeting is that this strategy was 
successfully pursued by the Bundesbank be-
fore EMU. Adopting monetary targeting might
therefore help the ESCB inherit some of the
Bundesbank’s credibility.
26 The strategy’s pri-
mary drawback is the high degree of uncer-
tainty about the likely behavior of monetary
aggregates in the euro area following the start of
monetary union.
Inflation targeting is attractive because
ultimately price stability is the responsibility of
the central bank.
27 Indeed, many newly inde-
pendent central banks, such as the Bank of
England and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand,
have opted for inflation targets as a means of
rapidly acquiring credibility for their commit-
ment to price stability. The primary drawback 
of an inflation-targeting strategy is the difficulty
of forecasting inflation at the relevant horizons.
Because monetary policy actions only affect10
inflation with a long and variable lag (of eigh-
teen months to two years), accurately forecast-
ing inflation at long horizons is crucial to the
success of an inflation-targeting strategy.
However, the two strategies overlap sig-
nificantly in their implications for the day-to-day
conduct of monetary policy. Both strategies are
forward-looking in their emphasis and aim to
control inflation by acting preemptively. Where
they differ most is in their implications for the
ESCB’s communications policy—that is, how
the ESCB goes about explaining its actions to
the general public. Under a monetary-targeting
strategy, the ESCB would explain and justify its
actions primarily by reference to the behavior of
the money stock vis-à-vis some target range.
Under inflation targeting, the ESCB would ex-
plain and justify its actions by reference to the
forecasted behavior of inflation vis-à-vis some
target level.
Because of the many uncertainties accom-
panying the start of EMU, it is not surprising that
the ESCB opted for a mixed strategy that com-
bines elements of inflation targeting and money
targeting. This is the “stability-oriented monetary
policy strategy” announced by the ESCB in
October 1998, whose key elements are a quan-
titative definition of price stability, a prominent
role for money with a reference value for the
growth of a monetary aggregate, and a broadly
based assessment of the outlook for future price
developments.
Adoption of a mixed strategy might seem
to defeat the purpose of articulating a strategy
in the first place. One of the most important rea-
sons for formulating and adhering to a strategy
is that doing so makes monetary policy actions
more transparent and easier to communicate to
the public. The simpler the strategy, the easier
that communication. Under a rigid monetary-
targeting strategy, a central bank need only
point to money growth in excess of its target to
justify increases in interest rates. Under a mixed
strategy, the situation would be more compli-
cated because the central bank would have to
spell out in detail how it would respond to dif-
ferent scenarios. In particular, the central bank
would need to explain what it would do if
growth in the money stock were signaling that
a tightening of monetary policy would be
appropriate, while the inflation forecast was sig-
naling that an easing of monetary policy was
appropriate. Having to detail all these contin-
gencies makes it considerably harder to com-
municate with the general public, and it is only
a short step from this to the look-at-everything,
respond-to-everything approach to policy.
Again, the contrast with the way the
Federal Reserve conducts monetary policy is
instructive. At present the Fed does not employ
either a monetary-targeting or inflation-targeting
approach. Monetary targets have not played an
important role in U.S. monetary policy since at
least the early 1990s. And the Fed has never for-
mally adopted inflation targeting as a strategy, at
least not to the extent that, say, the Bank of
England has. However, the Fed is a lot more for-
ward-looking in its deliberations than it was in
the 1970s.
28
Why the Fed does not feel the need to
articulate a strategy for monetary policy is an
open question. One reason may be that the Fed
has done reasonably well controlling inflation
and building credibility without a formal strat-
egy, and as long as that continues, it sees no
need to change. This is consistent with the view
that debates about strategy are most intense in
central banks that need to rapidly acquire credi-
bility for their commitment to price stability.
MONETARY POLICY TOOLS
The ESCB has three instruments available
for the conduct of monetary policy. It engages
in open market operations, offers standing facil-
ities, and requires credit institutions to hold
minimum reserves. Open market operations play
a central role in the conduct of monetary policy.
The ESCB has five types of instruments available
for the conduct of open market operations, the
most important of which is reverse transactions.
The ESCB also has the option of using outright
transactions, issuing debt certificates, making
foreign exchange swaps, and collecting fixed-
term deposits. Open market operations are ini-
tiated by the ECB but are conducted through the
NCBs. The ECB decides on the instrument to 
be used in all open market operations and on
the terms and conditions for their execution.
This highly decentralized approach to monetary
policy operations is in marked contrast to the
Fed’s practice of conducting all operations
through the New York Reserve Bank.
The ESCB offers standing facilities to pro-
vide and absorb overnight liquidity, signal the
general stance of monetary policy, and bound
overnight market interest rates. These facili-
ties—a marginal lending facility and a deposit
facility—are available to eligible counterparties
on their own initiative as long as they fulfill the
relevant conditions. Only financial institutions
subject to the reserve requirement may access
the standing facilities (and participate in open
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The Fed does not provide comparable facilities.
The ESCB transacts in a wide range of
financial assets in conducting monetary policy
operations. These assets are not necessarily
restricted to the debt liabilities of national gov-
ernments, but they are required to satisfy certain
criteria so as to protect the ESCB from the risk
of losses on its monetary policy operations.
Finally, the ECB has set a reserve require-
ment ratio at 2 percent, with the reservable
components of the liability base consisting of
overnight deposits, deposits with agreed matur-
ity up to two years, deposits redeemable at
notice up to two years, debt securities with
agreed maturity up to two years, and money
market paper. The ECB allows financial institu-
tions to deduct a lump-sum allowance of
100,000 euros from their reserve requirement.
The ECB remunerates reserve holdings at an
interest rate corresponding to the rate of its
main refinancing operations, with interest paid
on the first business day after the end of the
reserve maintenance period.
CONCLUSIONS
The launching of EMU is probably the 
single most important development in interna-
tional monetary relations in the past fifty years.
If monetary union succeeds, the euro may one
day challenge the U.S. dollar’s dominance in
international transactions. The sheer size of the
single-currency area will fundamentally alter
international monetary arrangements. How the
euro fares against the dollar will depend on 
the relative performances of the ESCB and the
Federal Reserve in maintaining price stability in
their respective territories. The ESCB starts with
the advantage of an unambiguous mandate for
price stability based on an international treaty
that can only be altered with the consent of all
its signatories. However, the diffuse distribu-
tion of power within the ESCB may make it 
difficult to resolve the conflicts of national inter-
ests that some academic critics of EMU believe
doom the undertaking to failure. By contrast,
the Federal Reserve System does not have as
strong a mandate for price stability, but its more
centralized decision-making structure arguably
enhances the monetary policy process in the
United States.
NOTES
1 The fifteen members of the EU are Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, and the UK. All but four members are partici-
pating in the first round of EMU. Denmark, Sweden,
and the UK are not participating for domestic political
reasons; Greece failed to meet the convergence crite-
ria laid down in the Maastricht Treaty but intends to
join as soon as possible.
2 EMU countries’ notes and coins will continue to circu-
late until 2002; however, they no longer exist as cur-
rencies in their own right but as nondecimal denomi-
nations of the euro. There are several reasons for the
three-year transition before the euro acquires a physi-
cal form. First, it will take time to adapt the physical
payments infrastructure in each of the participating
countries to the new notes and coins. In 1995, there
were some 3.15 million vending machines and 130,000
ATMs in the EU; such machines will have to be recali-
brated to accept the new currency. Second is the
magnitude of the task of replacing national currencies.
Printing enough banknotes and minting enough coins
to replace all the existing notes and coins will take
time. In 1994, more than 12 billion banknotes and 70
billion coins circulated in the EU, with a combined
weight of 300,000 metric tons. Minting of euro coins
began in May 1998. Finally, the transition allows busi-
nesses and the general public to become familiar 
with the new currency before having to use it for all
transactions. During the transition, the no-compulsion,
no-prohibition principle governs the use of the euro.
3 For a recent analysis of the unemployment problem in
Europe, see Ljunqvist and Sargent (1998).
4 For this article, the significance of the Committee of
Governors is that the economic unit created to support
the committee would subsequently form the cadre for
the European Central Bank.
5 For a textbook review of the major issues, see De
Grauwe (1997). See also Feldstein (1997) and
Wyplosz (1997).
6 Actually, many features of the ESCB are modeled on
Deutsche Bundesbank, which is modeled on the
Federal Reserve System. See Deutsche Bundesbank
(1995).
7 Maastricht Treaty Protocol (no. 3) on the Statute of the
European System of Central Banks and of the
European Central Bank, Article 12.1.
8 The FOMC in its current form, with the Board of
Governors enjoying a permanent majority, did not
come into being until 1935. When the Federal Reserve
System was established in 1914, it was thought dis-
count lending would be the primary tool of monetary
policy, with individual Reserve Banks having consider-
able discretion to set discount rates. It was not until
the 1920s that the potential of open market operations
was discovered. In the spring of 1922 the Committee
of Governors on Centralized Execution of Purchases
and Sales by Federal Reserve Banks was established
to coordinate the actions of the System. This commit-
tee was reconstituted as the Open Market Investment12
Committee (OMIC) in 1923, consisting of representa-
tives of the Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Cleveland,
and Chicago Reserve Banks, under the chairmanship
of the New York Bank. The OMIC was disbanded in
1930 and reconstituted as the Open Market Policy
Conference, composed of representatives from all
twelve Reserve Banks. The Banking Act of 1933 estab-
lished the FOMC, consisting of representatives of the
twelve Reserve Banks and the seven Board of
Governors members. The Banking Act of 1935 altered
the FOMC’s composition to give the seven Board
members a vote in open market policy and, more
importantly, reduce the representation of the Reserve
Banks to five members. This gave the Board of
Governors a permanent majority.
9 Federal Reserve Act, Section 4.20.
10 See, for example, the schematic diagrams of the infor-
mal power structure of the Federal Reserve System in
any intermediate money and banking textbook.
11 Statute of the European System of Central Banks and
of the European Central Bank, Articles 10 and 13.
12 Statute of the European System of Central Banks and
of the European Central Bank, Article 13.
13 European Central Bank (1998b).
14 Federal Reserve Act, Section 10.1.
15 Article 2 of the treaty states that “the Community shall
have as its task, by establishing a common market
and an economic and monetary union and by imple-
menting the common policies or activities referred to 
in Articles 3 and 3a, to promote throughout the Com-
munity a harmonious and balanced development of
economic activities, sustainable and non-inflationary
growth respecting the environment, a high degree of
convergence of economic performance, a high level 
of employment and of social protection, the raising of
the standard of living and quality of life, and economic
and social cohesion and solidarity between the
Member States.” Article 3a of the treaty states: “A1. 
For the purposes set out in Article 2, the activities of
the Member States and the Community shall include,
as provided in this Treaty and in accordance with the
timetable set out therein, the adoption of an economic
policy which is based on the close coordination of the
Member States’ economic policies, on the internal
market and on the definition of common objectives,
and conducted in accordance with the principle of 
an open market economy with free competition. 
2. Concurrently with the foregoing, and as provided in
this Treaty and in accordance with the timetable and
the procedures set out therein, these activities shall
include the irrevocable fixing of exchange rates lead-
ing to the introduction of a single currency, the ECU
[European currency unit], and the definition and con-
duct of a single monetary policy and exchange-rate
policy the primary objective of both of which shall be
to maintain price stability and, without prejudice to this
objective, to support the general economic policies in
the Community, in accordance with the principle of an
open market economy with free competition. 3. These
activities of the Member States and the Community
shall entail compliance with the following guiding prin-
ciples: stable prices, sound public finances and
monetary conditions and a sustainable balance of
payments.”
16 Other provisions in the treaty further reinforce the man-
date for price stability. First, Article 2 of the statute
repeats Article 105 of the treaty. Article 2 of the treaty
makes the promotion of noninflationary growth one of the
European Community’s objectives. Article 3 of the treaty
states that the primary objective of both monetary and
exchange rate policy following the start of monetary
union “shall be to maintain price stability.” Article 3 of
the treaty also states that achieving stable prices is
one of the guiding principles of the Community.
17 Alesina and Grilli (1992) evaluate the political and eco-
nomic independence of the ECB using the same criteria
as other authors to construct quantitative indexes of
central bank independence. They find that the ECB
will enjoy the same degree of political and economic
independence as the Bundesbank, which is somewhat
more independent than the Fed.
18 Statute of the European System of Central Banks and
of the European Central Bank, Article 14.2.
19 Posen (1993) is more sanguine about the ECB’s
prospects, arguing that it will have important political
support from the European financial community.
20 Alesina and Grilli (1992) use the terms political inde-
pendence and economic independence to refer to
essentially the same things.
21 European Central Bank (1998a).
22 See, for example, Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and
Timberlake (1993).
23 As Fischer (1994, 304) notes, “Monetary and exchange
rate policies cannot be independent. Under floating
rates, monetary policy affects the exchange rate. Thus
the government cannot have control over exchange
rate policy while the central bank has control over
monetary policy. The government should have the
authority to choose the exchange rate regime. If it
chooses a fixed exchange rate regime, it has then
essentially—though not completely—determined
monetary policy. While a central bank can be more or
less independent of the government in a fixed ex-
change rate regime, its independent ability to deter-
mine the rate of inflation and interest rates is sharply
curtailed.” See also Giovannini (1993).
24 See, for example, Ungerer (1997) and Gros and
Thygesen (1998).
25 See, in particular, Buiter (1998a, 1998b).
26 Issing (1994) argues along these lines.
27 For analyses of inflation targeting as a strategy for
monetary policy, see Haldane (1995), Leiderman and
Svensson (1995), and Bernanke and Mishkin (1997).
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